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ABSTRACT
The National Insurance Scheme (NIS) remains the cornerstone of the Norwegian pension system. 
The introduction of a mandatory occupational pension in 2006, and the restructuring of the 
contractual pension (AFP) in 2008, have, however, significantly increased the importance of labor 
market based pensions. Entitlement to AFP and contributions to occupational pensions are largely 
determined by individual employers, thus resulting in significant different future pension benefits 
and opportunities to retire early among employees. This article investigates what characterizes 
private sector enterprises that offer their employees both entitlement to AFP and a ‘good’ occupa-
tional pension, compared with enterprises that only offer a minimum pension. Analyzing data from 
a survey carried out in 2012 among 1107 private sector companies, I find that companies who 
offered an occupational pension before such schemes became mandatory in 2006 and compa-
nies where the social partners had conducted negotiations concerning pensions, were more likely 
to offer ‘good’ labor market based pensions. Both of these factors are linked to union strength and 
strong social partner relations.
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Introduction
Private or funded pensions play an important role in the retirement income system of many OECD countries (OECD 2017) and this role is expected to grow, as recent pension reforms in many countries will lead to a reduction in public pension ben-
efits. The private pensions employees are offered are also much more likely to be of the 
defined contribution (DC) type, meaning that individuals are more directly exposed to 
investment risk and bear the pension cost of living longer themselves (OECD 2012). 
When eligibility requirements and contribution rates are largely determined by individ-
ual employers, leading to wide disparities both within and between countries in terms of 
the coverage of private pension schemes and their value for employees, I find it interest-
ing to investigate which employers offers the best and which the poorest employer-based 
pensions and the reasons for this (Wiβ 2015). 
1  You can find this text and its DOI at https://tidsskrift.dk/njwls/index.
2  An earlier version of this paper was published in H. Dale-Olsen (red.), Norsk arbeidsliv i turbulente 
tider. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk (chapter 10, pp. 184–200).
3  Corresponding author: Tove Midtsundstad, Fafo Institute for Labour and Social Research, P.box 2947 
Tøyen, 0608 Oslo, Norway. E-mail: tim@fafo.no.
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Unlike Denmark, where occupational pensions have long been an integrated part 
of the collective agreement systems and cover over 90% of all employees, and Sweden 
which has a mandatory second pillar for all wage earners (Chen & Beetsma 2015), the 
occupational pension system in the private sector in Norway was a voluntary system 
until 2006, whereby the enterprise themselves decided whether or not they should offer 
their employees a supplementary pension. As a consequence, only half of all Norwegian 
employees in the private sector were entitled to an occupational pension before 2006, 
and the entitlement was unequally distributed among employees (Pedersen 2000; Midt-
sundstad & Hippe 2005). In 2006, however, Norway moved from this voluntary system 
to a mandatory occupational pension system allowing tax reliefs on contributions both 
to DC and defined benefit (DB) schemes. Today, all Norwegian employees are entitled 
to an occupational pension (Veland 2014).  However, to a large degree, the enterprises 
still decide on the level of contribution. Furthermore, having access to the contractual 
pension (AFP), which from 2011 is a lifelong, supplementary pension (equal to a DC 
scheme with a savings rate of 2.8% of salary each year), has become more important 
than ever for Norwegian employers’ income in old age, as the expected benefits from 
public pensions will decrease for younger cohorts (Hippe et al. 2018). However, there is 
still little knowledge on how different contribution rates are distributed among differ-
ent enterprises and groups of employees in the private sector. The aim of this article is 
to map the current coverage of different occupational pension schemes and AFP in the 
private sector in Norway and outline what characterizes enterprises that offer the best 
and the poorest employer-based pensions.  
Before presenting previous research and theory, data, and results, I shall give a brief 
overview of the Norwegian pension system and changes in private pension regulations 
over the last 17 years.
The Norwegian pension system
The Norwegian pension system is a three-pillar system where the National Insurance 
Scheme (NIS) old-age pension has traditionally been the main source of income for most 
people in their old age. Since the introduction of the mandatory occupational pension 
in 2006, all employees are also covered by an occupational pension scheme. Previously, 
only public-sector employees and around half of all private-sector employees were cov-
ered by such schemes. Furthermore, until 2001, there were only DB schemes in the pri-
vate sector. In the public sector, this is still the case, although a new public DC scheme 
will be implemented in 2020. In addition, since 1989, all civil servants (employees in the 
local government and state sector), and private sector employees covered by a collec-
tive wage agreement,1 have been entitled to a contractual early retirement pension (AFP 
pension), which has given them the opportunity to draw an old-age pension before the 
age of 67 and retire. 
As part of the Norwegian pension reform, changes have been made to the NIS old-
age pension and disability pension, to the laws regulating occupational pension schemes 
in the private sector, and to the contractual early retirement scheme (the AFP scheme) in 
the private sector (Midtsundstad 2014). An important feature of the Norwegian pension 
reform is flexible retirement starting at the age of 62 based on actuarial principles, which 
means that the earlier you draw your pension the less you get each year. On the other 
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hand, drawing a pension early no longer results in reduced pension payments for those 
still working. The old-age pension is also adjusted in line with average life expectancy to 
ensure that the pension system remains sustainable and can be seen as a substitute for 
an increase in the statutory pension age. In order to preserve the value of earned pen-
sion rights, the old-age pension is also adjusted each year in line with the average wage 
increase in Norway. During the payment period, annual adjustments are made in line 
with the average wage increase and then reduced by 0.75%. 
In addition, the AFP scheme in the private sector, which is part of the sector’s collec-
tive wage agreements, was changed from an early retirement scheme to a supplementary 
old-age pension in the 2008 bargaining round (and implemented in 2011). Prior to this, 
it was only those who retired between the ages of 62 and 67 who received an AFP pen-
sion. Today, all employees covered by the scheme are entitled to a lifelong supplementary 
pension, whether they retire early or not. The new AFP scheme in the private sector 
follows the same principle of actuarial neutrality as the NIS old-age pension. However, 
to receive an AFP pension, the individual must be working in a company covered by a 
collective wage agreement when they retire. If an employee moves from a company with 
an AFP scheme (covered by a collective wage agreement) to a company without an AFP 
scheme (not covered by a collective wage agreement) at age 60 or 61, for example, they 
will lose their right to the AFP pension even if they worked in a company with an AFP 
scheme up to that date. 
The NIS old-age pension and AFP pension can today be drawn from the age of 62, 
whether the person continues working or not. The precondition is that the accumulated 
pension entitlements exceed the minimum pension level,2 after adjustments are made 
based on changes in life expectancy. Continued employment after the age of 62 will also 
result in the accumulation of increased pension entitlements (up to the age of 75) and 
thus a higher annual pension when it is finally drawn. However, flexible retirement in 
Norway is not a possibility for all older workers. A large number of women in the private 
sector with low wages, many years in part-time work and no AFP pension are not entitled 
to draw a full old-age pension from the age of 62, as they have not accumulated a pen-
sion entitlement, which exceeds the annual minimum pension level (LO & NHO 2017). 
As earlier mentioned, since 2006, all employers have been obliged to offer their 
employees an occupational pension scheme. As a result, there has been a huge increase 
in the number of employees covered by DC schemes and many employers have chosen 
to end their DB schemes and replace them with far less generous DC schemes. Today, 
around 80% of all employees in the private sector are covered by DC schemes (Veland 
2014). In other words, the occupational pensions market in the Norwegian private sec-
tor has undergone major changes since the turn of the millennium. Although the NIS 
retirement pension remains the cornerstone of the Norwegian pension system, the intro-
duction of a mandatory occupational pension (OTP) in 2006, and the restructuring of 
the AFP pension scheme in 2008, have helped increase the significance of labor market 
based pensions. The type of occupational pension offered and entitlement to an AFP 
pension have thereby become more important than ever for the level of future pen-
sion benefits and the opportunity for employees in the private sector to retire aged 62. 
According to Hippe, Hammer and Vøien (2018) expected replacement rates for those 
born in 1963 will vary from approximately 52% for those without AFP and an occu-
pational pension at a minimum level, to 72% for those having both AFP and a good 
occupational pension. 
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In general, state regulations influence the scope of occupational pensions as well 
as the preferences of employers and trade unions (Shalev 1996; Trampusch 2013). The 
regulations for occupational pensions (DC schemes) in the private sector in Norway 
only stipulate the minimum and maximum rates for the annual contributions. As such, 
the regulations permit large variations in occupational pension entitlements between 
enterprises and groups of employees. Since the details of schemes are determined by the 
individual employer, and the schemes are rarely included in collective agreements (Barth 
& Nergaard 2015), the employer ultimately decides on the rate of contributions. The 
employer, however, has to offer the same scheme to all his employees. The minimum DC 
schemes in 2012 only guaranteed that the employer contributes 2% of the employee’s 
income between 1 and 6 G (G = base amount = 95 800 – 574 800 NOK in 2018) every 
year, 3 which amounts to a rather small supplement to the NIS old-age pension according 
to an estimate of expected pension benefits for future generations (Hippe et al. 2018). 
Employers also decide whether the accumulated pension capital and disbursements 
should be regulated at a specific rate (guaranteed yield) or follow fluctuations in the 
stock market. In case of the latter, each employee may determine the risk profile (high, 
medium, or low), but very few employees actively make such choices (Midtsundstad & 
Hyggen 2011). Most employees, including younger cohorts, therefore have a medium or 
low risk profile on their pension savings.
Given the growing importance of supplementary pension schemes in Norway and 
other European countries (Trampusch 2009), along with an increased heterogeneity of 
possible occupational pension schemes and contribution rates and thus benefit levels, it 
is interesting to examine more closely the distribution of different schemes within coun-
tries and between enterprises (Wiβ 2015). The aim of this article is to investigate what 
characterizes Norwegian private sector enterprises that offer the best and the poorest 
employer-based pensions, respectively. 
Earlier research
According to Wiβ (2015), studies analyzing welfare have previously focused on coun-
tries as units, taking only one pension scheme or the average representing the countries. 
An important goal of the article is to identify some of the factors that seem to affect the 
variation in enterprises’ occupational pension schemes within countries. 
Literature focuses on several different factors when trying to explain the differences 
between countries, sectors and enterprises in terms of occupational welfare: the skills 
of employees, the power resources of trade unions, type of industry and sector, size of 
the enterprise, etc. (Brigden & Meyer 2005; Freeman 1981; Greve 2007; Gustman et 
al. 1994; Ippolito 1991; Leigh 1981; Mares 2003; McCarthy 2006; Natali et al. 2018; 
Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2012; Trampusch & Eichenberg 2012; Wiβ 2015). 
Most economic studies have investigated why some companies offer an occupa-
tional pension plan while others do not, and less on the variation in enterprises’ con-
tributions to pension plans. The main behavioral motivations for enterprises to offer 
a pension plan, as summarized by Gustman et al. (1994), are to regulate work effort, 
turnover other than retirement, retirement, and worker quality, and thereby cut labor 
costs and raise productivity. However, there are few studies that have been able to test 
how pensions (deferred payment) affect worker effort or productivity (ibid.).
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Enterprises facing substantial hiring and training costs may, however, find it profit-
able to discourage turnover by offering pension plans. Allen, Clark, and McDermed 
(1993) found that worker turnover was much lower among workers covered by pen-
sions than workers without pensions. The main factors responsible for lower turnover 
were capital losses in pension wealth (exit costs for workers who leave the enterprise), 
in addition to self-selection and compensation levels. 
Enterprises with high training costs might also be more likely to offer pension pro-
grams than enterprises that invest less in their employees in order to attract and keep 
particular employees – ‘stayers’ instead of ‘movers’ (Ippolito 1991, 1992). In addition, 
pension plans can be an instrument for enterprises to control retirement flows, as work-
ers with generous pensions retire earlier than those with lower pension benefits (Gustman 
et al. 1994). 
According to economic theory, pensions can also constitute an advantage in the 
competition for labor (see, e.g., McCarthy 2006). Pensions, especially DB schemes, 
might also be a more important way for enterprises to obtain long-term commitment 
from workers than wage tilt (Ippolito 1991). Enterprises that employ highly and specifi-
cally qualified employees, who are of high value, especially in times of labor shortage, 
might therefore offer occupational welfare to attract employees and bind them to the 
enterprise (Wiβ 2015). In other words, skills can materialize in terms of employee power 
vis-à-vis the employer, which in term can be used to ask for additional benefits such as 
better occupational pensions. Hence, research has found that coverage tends to be high 
in enterprises that predominantly rely on highly skilled employees and low in enterprises 
that predominantly rely on a workforce requiring low general skills (Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 
2012; Wiβ 2015). 
Furthermore, several studies have found that strong trade unions are more likely 
to be successful in negotiating with employers about occupational pensions than weak 
trade unions (Wiβ 2015). By contrast, the lack of both employees with high and specific 
skills and strong trade unions will, according to Wiβ (2015), often result in occupational 
pension schemes with low employer contributions. Freeman (1981), who studied the 
impact of unions on employer fringe benefit costs, also found that unions increase the 
ratio of fringe benefits to wages, especially expenditures that represent deferred forms 
of compensation, such as pensions. A study by Leigh (1981), on the other hand, showed 
that unions play an important role in extending the coverage of private pension pro-
grams, although unionized workers eligible for a pension expected to receive less in 
retirement benefits than nonunion workers. 
In addition, companies may also be interested in using occupational welfare in 
exchange for wage moderation, and as a way to reduce costs and thereby achieve inter-
national competitiveness (Natali et al. 2018). Earlier research has found that highly 
profitable and export-oriented industries tend to offer more generous occupational 
welfare schemes more frequently than companies primarily producing for the domestic 
markets (Ibid). Company size has also been a common explanation for occupational 
welfare: small and medium sized enterprises offer less generous occupational welfare 
schemes than large companies (Mares 2001; Trampusch & Eichenberger 2012).
Studies of occupational pensions in Norway have also found that the size of enter-
prises, employee skills, and trade union power have an impact on occupational pension 
coverage (Midtsundstad & Hippe 2005; Hernæs et al. 2011; Pedersen 2000). According 
to previous analyses, such schemes were less prevalent in small enterprises than in large 
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ones (Hernæs et al. 2011; Midtsundstad & Hippe 2005). Before 2006, less than half 
of all private-sector employees in Norway were entitled to an occupational pension. 
In most cases, these were DB schemes and guaranteed the employee a total pension 
equivalent to 66% of their final salary or more (Pedersen 2000; Midtsundstad & Hippe 
2005). Furthermore, occupational pension schemes in Norway before 2006 were more 
frequently found in sectors such as health care, education and research, transport and 
telecommunications than in the hotel/catering or construction industries (Midtsundstad 
& Hippe 2005). Occupational pension schemes in 2003 in Norway were also more 
widespread in enterprises with well-established social partner relations than in enter-
prises with low unionization rates and no collective agreements (Midtsundstad & Hippe 
2005; Hernæs et al. 2011), thus corroborating previous studies (Pedersen 2000; Hippe 
& Pedersen 1992). The likelihood of having an occupational pension scheme was also 
higher in enterprises that were exposed to limited competition in their markets for goods 
or services, and also in enterprises that had a greater degree of numerical flexibility 
(Midtsundstad & Hippe 2005). Furthermore, occupational pensions in Norway were 
typically found in enterprises with decentralized wage negotiations and the requirement 
for long training, and were associated with tax gains (both for employees and employ-
ers) and expected increases in average tenure (Hernæs et al. 2011). 
Although occupational pensions became mandatory in Norway in 2006, and most 
Norwegian employees are today entitled to an occupational pension, it is still interest-
ing to investigate which factors might explain the variation in employers’ contributions 
to occupational pension schemes. My main hypothesis is that the size of the enterprise, 
employee skills, training costs, and trade union power also play an important role in 
deciding who gets the best and who gets the poorest occupational pensions. Building 
on earlier analyses, this article investigates whether the distribution of ‘good’ and ‘poor’ 
occupational pensions in current working life in Norway follows traditional patterns, 
as described above. I ask whether variations in the coverage of different DC and DB 
schemes and contribution rates are a result of differences in the size of enterprises, dif-
ferences in the skills of their employees, training costs, the enterprise’s need for labor 
and the recruitment situation, differences in their economic situations, differences in the 
strength and bargaining power of local trade unions, as well as in enterprises’ history 
and the tradition of offering occupational welfare. 
Data and methodology
The analyses in this article are based on data from an enterprise survey (Arbeids- og 
bedriftsundersøkelsen 2012 – ABU2012) conducted in 2012 by Statistics Norway (SN) 
combined with individual register data from SN on all employees in the participat-
ing enterprises. ABU2012 contacted a representative sample of 3519 private and pub-
lic enterprises with more than ten employees, of which 1888 enterprises participated 
(response rate: 53.7%). The sample was stratified according to enterprise size, year it 
was established, and private and public sector. I therefore use sampling weights esti-
mated by SN when analyzing data (Holmøy 2013). In this article, we only use data from 
the private sector (N = 1107), since all public sector employees in 2012 had a DB scheme 
guaranteeing a pension from age 67 equal to 66% of their last salary (given 30 years’ 
tenure in the public sector).
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The survey consisted of telephone interviews with the managing directors and 
included, among other things, the coverage of collective agreements, the coverage of 
different occupational pension schemes (DC, DB, and AFP) including benefit levels/con-
tribution rates, whether trade union members were involved in changing the pension 
schemes, the size of the enterprise, whether the employers are organized and the percent-
age of employees organized, and a range of other company characteristics (see Holmøy 
2013 & Dale-Olsen 2015 for an extended documentation of the survey). 
Examining pension entitlements as a whole, I investigate the proportion of enter-






























Enterprises with ‘good’ employer-based pension schemes are defined as those offer-
ing an AFP pension together with either a DC pension above the minimum level (2%) 
for income up to 6 G, or a DB pension providing 66% or more of the final salary. 
Enterprises that offer no entitlement to an AFP pension and have a DC scheme with a 
2% contribution for income up to 6 G, or a DB pension scheme with a yield of 65% or 
less, are designated as enterprises offering ‘poor’ pension schemes. Classified as offering 
‘moderate’ schemes are those enterprises that either offer a DC pension above the mini-
mum level, or a DB pension providing 66% or more of final salary, but do not know 
whether they offer an AFP pension or not; offer an AFP pension but a minimum DC 
pension (2% contribution) or a DB pension providing 65% or less; or enterprises where 
46 Which Norwegian Enterprises Offer the Poorest Tove Midtsundstad
the managers did not know the occupational pension scheme’s rate of contributions or 
level of benefits.
A total of 20% of the enterprises in our sample offer ‘good’ pension schemes. 
Together, these enterprises employ 18% of the total number of employees covered by 
the sample (Figure 1). A total of 26% of the enterprises, covering 19% of the employees, 




There is considerable variation between sectors (Figure 1). Entitlement to an AFP 
pension scheme and an occupational pension scheme above the minimum level (‘good’ 
schemes) is most common in private enterprises in the finance and insurance sectors 
(where 34% of employees are eligible to receive this combination of schemes), in manu-
facturing (also where 34% of employees are eligible for such schemes), and in education, 
health, and social services in the private sector (where 32% of employees are covered by 
such schemes). Those sectors with the fewest ‘good’ schemes are retail, hotel, and cater-
ing, where only 11% of employees have ‘good’ pension entitlements, the transport and 
storage sectors and other private sector services, where these entitlements only apply to 
8% of employees. 
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The majority of employees with ‘poor’ pension entitlements work in the construction 
sector (covers 28% of the total number of employees), in the retail, hotel, and catering 
sectors (26% of employees), and in other private sector services (25% of employees). The 
lowest number with ‘poor’ pension entitlements are found in the finance and property 
sectors (2%) and in manufacturing (5%). The fact that few employees in these industries 
have poor entitlements must be seen partly in the context of the manufacturing sector’s 
strong collective agreement coverage and hence its AFP pension scheme coverage. 
To obtain a clearer picture of which factors might increase the likelihood of an 
enterprise offering ‘good’ or ‘poor’ pension schemes to their employees, I performed 
a selection of regression analyses. Specifically, I examined whether and to what extent 
social partner relations, globalization and the situation with regard to competition, and 
recruitment and workforce composition increase the likelihood that an enterprise will 
have a) an AFP scheme in combination with a DC pension scheme above the minimum 
level (2%) or a DB scheme that pays out a benefit corresponding to 66% or more of 
final salary (=1) or not (=0); b) no AFP scheme in combination with a DC scheme at the 
minimum level (2%) or a DB pension scheme that pays out a benefit corresponding to 
65% of final salary or less (=1) or not (=0). 
To take account of social partner relations in the analyses, I investigated whether 
strong social partner relations (0 = no, 1 = yes), social partners that have conducted a 
pension negotiation process (0 = no, 1 = yes), an occupational pension scheme estab-
lished before 2006 (0 = no, 1 = yes), and occupational pension scheme has been changed 
since 2001 (0 = no, 1 = yes) have an effect on pension entitlements.
The importance of globalization and competition is measured by examining whether 
the enterprise has foreign owners (0=no, 1=yes), its main market is outside the Nordic 
countries (0=Norway and the Nordic countries, 1=the rest of the world); and whether 
it is exposed to strong competition in the product/services market (1=strong or fairly 
strong, 0=fairly or very little).
The effect of the recruitment situation is measured by examining workforce require-
ments in the short term (1=need to increase, 0=unchanged or reduced), and the recruit-
ment situation for the main occupational group (very or fairly difficult =0, very or fairly 
easy =1).
Since the costs related to DB pension schemes increase with the number of older 
employees working in the enterprise, I have controlled for the proportion of employees 
aged 55 years and over (0=less than 40%, 1=40% or more). Similarly, I include the use 
of temporary employees (0=no, 1=yes), as only permanent employees are entitled to sub-
scribe to the enterprise’s pension scheme. Widespread use of temporary employees may 
therefore help increase the likelihood of having good pension entitlements for the core 
workforce and reduce the likelihood of having poor entitlements. 
In all the analyses, I control for industry sector (1=manufacturing, 2= construction, 
3=retail, hotel and catering, 4=transport and storage, 5=information, communication, 
culture and entertainment, 6=finance and insurance, real estate, etc., 7= other services, 
8=education, health, and social services (ref.)), size of the enterprise (1=10-19, 2=20-49, 
3=50-99, 4=100-199, 5=200 etc.=ref), main occupational group in the enterprise [1=aca-
demic occupations, 2=office, sales, and service occupations, 3=blue-collar occupations 
(ref.)], proportion of employees with university level education (0=less than 50% with 
higher education, 1=50% or more with higher education), and year the enterprise was 
established (1=after 2001, 0=2001 or earlier). 
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Table 2 summarizes the distribution of the independent variables, and the bivariate 
correlation between each individual variable and the dependent variable. I have also 
checked whether there are strong correlations between the independent variables (not 
shown), and the Pearson r was rather small (< 0.3). Hence, I will assume that collinearity 
is no problem in the multivariate analysis. 
The bivariate analyses (Table 2) show that strong social partner relations, having 
negotiated on occupational pensions (OP), having offered OP before it became manda-
tory in 2006 and having changed the pension schemes after 2001 are all factors that 
increase the probability of an enterprise offering ‘good’ pension entitlements. Further-
more, having a foreign owner decreases the likelihood of offering a ‘good’ pension, 
while having the main market outside the Nordic countries increases the likelihood 
of enterprises offering ‘good’ pension entitlements. On the other hand, all the other 
coefficients seem to have no significant impact on the likelihood of offering ‘good’ 
pensions. In accordance with this, the same factors which increase the probability of 
offering ‘good’ pension entitlements seem to decrease the likelihood of offering ‘poor’ 
pension entitlements. However, having one’s main market outside the Nordic countries 
seem to increase the probability of offering both ‘good’ and ‘poor’ pension entitle-
ments. In addition, strong competition in the market does not correlate with offering 
a ‘poor’ pension, but increases the likelihood of enterprises offering ‘good’ pension 
entitlements. 
Table 2  Overview of the independent variables and the bivariate coefficients (Exp(B)). Weighted. 
N = 1107







Strong relations between social 
partners 
36.2 3.985* 0.170*
Have negotiated on occupational 
pension (OP)
12.1 2.869* 0.384*
Offered OP before 2006 42.1 2.337* 0.337*
Changed the OP scheme after 2001 21.5 1.671* 0.418*
Globalization and market 
situation
Foreign owner 12.0 0.529* 1.392
Main market outside the Nordic 
countries 
  6.4 2.210* 1.576*




Need for more labor in the next  
12 months  
31.3 1.023 1.103
Easy to get competent labor  42.9 1.327 0.810
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Share of older workers 55+ (>40 %) 17.4 1.406 1.143
Share of temporary employees  
(>20 %)
15.0 0.869 0.946
Type of labor 
Share of highly skilled employees  
(>50 %)
34.4 1.083 1.033
Core employees = blue-collar workers 
(ref.)
22.6
Academic occupations 47.7 1.271 0.915




The results of the logistic regression analyses (the average marginal effects and robust 
standard deviations) are presented in Table 3. The marginal effects for the control vari-
ables (industry, size of the enterprise, and year the enterprise was established) are not 
shown.
Table 3  Characteristics of enterprises that offer ‘good’ and ‘poor’ pension entitlements. Weighted 
figures. Marginal effects and robust standard deviations
‘Good’ pensions ‘Poor’ pensions
Social partner relations
Strong relations between social partners 0.0017 (0.00783) -0.0015 (0.0099)
Have negotiated on occupational pension (OP) 0.1365 (0.37834) -0.1829 (0.0730)
Offered OP before 2006 0.0989 (0.33527) -0.1918 (0.0396)
Changed the OP scheme after 2001 0.0489 (0.03609) -0.0821 (0.5318)
Globalization and market situation
Foreign owner -0.0698 (0.0658) 0.0309 (0.0567)
Main market outside the Nordic countries 0.1238 (0.5001) 0.0495 (0.0637)
Market situation – self-rated (ref.=strong competition) 0.0623 (0.0422) 0.0645 (0.0449)
Recruitment situation 
Need for more labor in the next 12 months  0.0076 (0.0362) 0.0175 (0.0389)
Easy to get competent labor  0.0425 (0.3354) -0.0413 (0.0368)
(Continued)
50 Which Norwegian Enterprises Offer the Poorest Tove Midtsundstad
‘Good’ pensions ‘Poor’ pensions
Cost
Share of older workers 55+ (> 40 %) 0.4815 (0.0408) -0.0093 (0.0456)
Share of temporary employees (> 20 %) -0.0359 (0.0508) -0.0065 (0.0507)
Type of labor 
Share of high skilled employees (> 50 %) -0.0342 (0.0413) 0.0543 (0.0467)







The analyses show that the probability of an enterprise offering its employees ‘good’ 
pension entitlements still increases if the enterprise’s occupational pension scheme was 
established before 2006, and if the enterprise negotiated with its employees on pensions 
during the last two years. A main market outside Norway and the Nordic countries also 
increases the likelihood of the enterprise offering ‘good’ labor market based pensions. 
However, after controls for the other independent variables in the model, strong social 
partner relations are no longer significant, and neither is having a foreign owner. This 
is also the case with regard to competition in the product/ service market, recruitment 
situation, and workforce requirements. The same applies to workforce characteristics 
such as proportion of employees with higher education, proportion of employees over 
55 years of age, and the enterprise’s use of temporary employees. The age of the enter-
prise does, however, reveal something (not shown in Table 2), since enterprises that were 
established before 2001 offer better pension entitlements than those established later. 
Industry sector, on the other hand, has no effect, nor does the size of the enterprise mea-
sured as the number of employees.
If we look at the likelihood of an enterprise offering its employees ‘poor’ pension 
entitlements, this still decreases if the occupational pension scheme was established after 
2006, and if pensions have been negotiated during the last two years. Strong social part-
ner relations in themselves, however, are of no significance in the multivariate analysis, 
nor are any of the other factors examined, that is, competition in the product and/or 
service market, foreign ownership, main market within or outside the Nordic countries, 
recruitment situation and workforce requirements, type of workforce, proportion of 
employees with higher education, and proportion of older employees. 
Discussion
What primarily characterizes Norwegian enterprises that offer ‘good’ occupational 
pensions are the fact that they offered their employees an occupational pension before 
this became mandatory in 2006. This may indicate that well-established enterprises, 
Table 3 (Continued)
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which have long prioritized occupational pensions for their employees, do not choose 
to weaken the conditions of their pensions. In other words, already established, good 
schemes are not very easy to change, even when the regulations changed and opened up 
for DC schemes. This is in line with other studies (Hippe & Midtsundstad 2016), show-
ing that enterprises who change from DB to DC schemes in most cases offer saving 
rates well above the minimum level. As other studies have shown (Hernæs et al. 2011; 
Midtsundstad & Hippe 2005), strong social partner relations were also an important 
factor in explaining whether a company offered occupational pensions or not before it 
became mandatory. We may then indirectly also be measuring union strength. However, 
the correlation may also be an indicator that these enterprises have been doing well 
for a long time, as they offered an occupational pension scheme before this became 
mandatory, and that they are still financially healthy, as they still offer good pension 
conditions. Yet, the correlation might also be attributable to the fact that many enter-
prises sat on the fence in 2012 when there were still doubts regarding the quality of the 
DC schemes that could be offered. A considerable proportion of the enterprises that 
still reported having a ‘good’ DB scheme in 2012 may well have been opting to take a 
‘wait-and-see’ approach. In other words, based on the data from 2012, it is probably 
too early to draw any final conclusions regarding the effect of the restructuring of 
occupational pension regulations on pension conditions for private sector employees 
in the long term.
In contrast to the findings of previous analyses (e.g., Midtsundstad & Hippe 2005) 
and the bivariate analyses (Table 2), the multivariate analyses show that strong social 
partner relations in the form of a high level of unionization and local agreements at the 
enterprise level no longer have an impact on the pension conditions at the enterprise 
level. As mentioned earlier, the explanation for this rather surprising result might be that 
the importance of strong social partner relations is now mediated through the factor 
‘offered an occupational pension scheme before 2006’ that, based on earlier studies, is 
correlated with strong social partner relations (Midtsundstad & Hippe 2005; Hernæs 
et al. 2011). In addition, the fact of having negotiated on pension conditions increases 
the likelihood of enterprises offering ‘good’ pension entitlements. This indicates that 
cooperation between the social partners locally may be an important factor for the lev-
els of occupational pension benefits and contributions. The fact that pension conditions 
are subject to negotiation in some companies even though the occupational pension 
scheme falls within the employer’s remit, and that very few enterprises had included the 
occupational pension scheme in their collective agreements indicate that the enterprises’ 
owners and management teams have been willing to allow the codetermination of the 
trade unions and to take account of their demands, that is, that they place an emphasis 
on good social partner relations. 
Globalization in the form of an international market also appears to be of some 
importance. The same does not apply to foreign ownership and strong competition in 
the product/services market. It is nonetheless rather surprising that the enterprises that 
have their main market outside the Nordic countries are those that offer the best pen-
sions. The reason may be that markets outside the Nordic countries in most cases is the 
rest of Europe where labor market based pension schemes are relatively widespread and 
hence also represent a cost for competitors. In addition, some enterprises may also use 
occupational pensions in exchange for wage moderation to reduce costs and thereby 
achieve international competitiveness (Natali et al. 2018).
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According to economic theory, pensions can constitute a competitive advantage in 
the competition for labor (see, e.g., McCarthy 2006). However, the analyses indicate 
that Norwegian enterprises do not widely use an offer of ‘good’ pensions to attract 
competent labor, since enterprises in need of more employees in the short term and 
those that have problems recruiting qualified labor are neither more nor less likely to 
offer ‘good’ pension conditions than those that have no need for more employees and/
or experience few problems with recruitment. This may be associated with the relatively 
limited knowledge of labor market based pensions among the population (Hermansen 
& Midtsundstad 2013). Norwegian enterprises may therefore realize that there is little 
to be gained from offering ‘good’ but costly pension schemes as a means of attracting 
and retaining competent labor. 
The composition of the workforce when it comes to types of core labor (be these 
white-collar or blue-collar workers), a large proportion of employees over the age of 
55, and a large proportion of employees with higher education, also appears to have 
little significance. This lack of importance of the age composition of the workforce may 
be associated, on the other hand, with the fact that a fairly large number of enterprises 
that previously offered DB schemes have now replaced these with DC schemes. Hence, 
enterprises’ pension costs do not increase with increasing age as they did previously. Nor 
does the use of temporary employees increase the likelihood of the core workforce hav-
ing ‘good’ pension conditions, which was the hypothesis. 
Previous analyses have shown that primarily those with a higher education back-
ground were covered by occupational pension schemes in the private sector before 2006 
(Midtsundstad & Hippe 2005). However, employing a high proportion of employees 
with higher education does not appear to increase the likelihood of enterprises offering 
‘good’ pension conditions in 2012. This does not necessarily mean that enterprises with 
highly skilled employees no longer offer better occupational pensions than enterprises 
where the majority of employees have a lower level of education. Rather, the most likely 
explanation is that many typical enterprises with highly educated employees (e.g., ICT 
companies) are not part of collective agreements which include AFP. The same reasoning 
might also explain the absence of any correlation between the type of core workforce 
and occupational pension conditions. Although enterprises whose core workforce con-
sists of white-collar workers have better occupational pensions than enterprises primar-
ily employing blue-collar workers or that offer positions in office, sales, and service 
work, access to AFP is more widespread in manufacturing and the transport and stor-
age industry (mainly employing blue-collar workers) than in enterprises that mainly 
employ white-collar workers. The reason is that access to AFP schemes is not dependent 
on the bargaining power of local trade unions but rather on the bargaining power of 
trade unions nationally; hence, AFP is more equally distributed among enterprises with 
a different skills composition than ‘good’ DC and DB schemes. This also illustrates how 
important trade union power and collective agreed pensions at the national level are in 
securing a decent pension level for low skilled workers (Natali et al 2018). 
Conclusion 
The occupational pension system in the private sector in Norway has undergone con-
siderable change since the turn of the millennium. Although the NIS pension is still 
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the cornerstone of the Norwegian pension system, the introduction of the mandatory 
occupational pension in 2006, and the restructuring of the AFP scheme in the private 
sector in 2008 (with effect from 2011) have increased the importance of employer-based 
pensions. The type of occupational pension, level of contribution, as well as the entitle-
ment to an AFP pension are now of increased importance with regard to the pension 
that individuals can expect to receive, when they can start to draw their pension, and 
when they can retire. 
At the turn of the millennium, only half of all private-sector employees had an 
occupational pension scheme, and the majority had a scheme that entitled them to a 
pension equivalent to 66% of their final salary (including the old age pension from 
the NIS) after 30 years of earnings. Today, everyone is entitled to an occupational 
pension, but the variation in schemes and levels of benefits is far greater. Almost one 
in four had a DB scheme in 2012, while two out of three had a DC scheme. However, 
the quality of DC schemes varies greatly, and the largest proportion of employees have 
a scheme at the minimum level, which only ensures annual savings equivalent to 2% 
of salary. This provides a relatively low supplementary pension to the old-age pension 
from the NIS.
A total of 59% of employees in private enterprises with 10 or more employees are, 
however, part of collective agreements and entitled to an AFP pension. It is interesting to 
note in this regard the important role of AFP and hence collectively agreed occupational 
pensions in securing a ‘moderate’ or ‘good’ pension in old age for blue-collar workers. 
This underscores, as earlier research also shows (Natalie et al. 2018), the importance of 
employees’ collective power in securing all groups of employees an acceptable pension in 
old age, including low skilled groups with low individual bargaining power.
However, a high degree of unionization and local tariff agreements seem to have no 
bearing on the contribution level or benefit level of occupational pensions when control-
ling for other relevant factors, including whether or not the OP scheme was established 
prior to 2006. Nevertheless, according to earlier studies, strong social partner relations 
at the enterprise level increased the probability of companies offering an OP scheme 
before 2006, which in most cases implied that they were offering quite ‘good’ pension 
entitlements. Furthermore, if pension negotiations have taken place in the workplace 
during the last two years (prior to 2012), this also increases the likelihood of good occu-
pational pension conditions being offered. It is reasonable to assume that this is more 
likely to happen in companies with strong social partner relations. Yet, it is also an indi-
cator of good cooperation between the social partners or that management is attentive 
to the demands of trade unions, since occupational pensions fall within the employer’s 
remit and such pension schemes are very rarely included in the collective agreement. 
History is also relevant, as enterprises that have historically had occupational pension 
schemes for their employees (before this became mandatory) also more frequently offer 
good pension conditions today.
Globalization and competition also appear to have some effect on pension con-
ditions, since enterprises whose main market is international offer good occupational 
pension conditions more frequently than enterprises whose market is Norway and the 
Nordic countries. 
Contrary to economic theory, however, ‘good’ pension entitlements do not appear 
to be used to retain and recruit employees in Norway, as an increased need for labor and/
or recruitment problems do not appear to have any bearing on the pension conditions 
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offered by companies. This may be associated with people’s limited knowledge of labor 
market based pensions, making the offer of a good pension ineffective for recruitment 
purposes or as an instrument for retaining competent employees. 
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Notes
1  The AFP scheme covers around half of all private sector employees (Nergaard 2009) but 
almost 80% of employees older than 60 (Midtsundstad 2004).
2  The minimum pension level (garantipensjonen) is after May 1, 2018, equal to NOK 194 
192 for a single person (approximately 19,800 euros).
3  Minimum contribution rate is 2%. Up to 2013, the maximum rate was up to 8% of income 
between 6 and 12 G – and 5% of income between 1 and 6 G. After that the maximum 
contribution rate was changed to 7% for all income up to 12 G, including a supplementary 
contribution of up to 18.1% of income between 7.1 and 12 G (i.e., maximum of 25.1%). 
